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Abstract: The privacy of users and information are becoming increasingly important with the 
growth and pervasive use of mobile devices such as wearables, mobile phones, drones, and Internet 
of Things (IoT) devices. Today many of these mobile devices are equipped with cameras which 
enable users to take pictures and record videos anytime they need to do so. In many such cases, 
bystanders’ privacy is not a concern, and as a result, audio and video of bystanders are often 
captured without their consent. We present results from a user study in which 21 participants were 
asked to use a wearable system called FacePET developed to enhance bystanders’ facial privacy by 
providing a way for bystanders to protect their own privacy rather than relying on external systems 
for protection. While past works in the literature focused on privacy perceptions of bystanders when 
photographed in public/shared spaces, there has not been research with a focus on user perceptions 
of bystander-based wearable devices to enhance privacy. Thus, in this work, we focus on user 
perceptions of the FacePET device and/or similar wearables to enhance bystanders’ facial privacy. 
In our study, we found that 16 participants would use FacePET or similar devices to enhance their 
facial privacy, and 17 participants agreed that if smart glasses had features to conceal users’ 
identities, it would allow them to become more popular. 
Keywords: bystanders’ privacy; facial privacy; face detection; face recognition; Internet of Things; 
wearables; usability; usable privacy; adversarial machine learning 
 
1. Introduction 
The availability of cameras and Artificial Intelligence (AI) through wearables, mobile phones, 
drones, and Internet of Things (IoT) devices is making bystanders’ facial privacy more significant to 
the general public. Bystanders’ privacy arises when a device that collects sensor data (such as photos, 
sound or video) can be used to identify third-parties (or their actions) when they have not given 
consent to be part of the collection [1,2]. Even though bystanders’ privacy has been an issue since the 
end of the 19th century with the invention of portable cameras that could take photos in a short 
amount of time [1], recent advances of camera-enabled devices (e.g., mobile phones, IoT) combined 
with Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Internet have raised awareness about this privacy issue 
especially in the last couple of years. We show in Figure 1 some of issues related to bystanders’ facial 
privacy. 
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Figure 1. Issues related to bystanders’ privacy. Our focus in this work is to study bystanders’ 
perceptions of a bystander-centric device/system to enhance facial privacy. 
Recently, various solutions [3–24] that address bystanders’ privacy have been proposed in the 
literature. However, most of these solutions rely on bystanders trusting third-party devices or 
systems which do not give a choice to protect their privacy. To enable bystanders to protect their 
privacy, we have developed the Facial Privacy Enhancing Technology (FacePET) [25] smart wearable 
device. FacePET is a wearable system made of intelligent goggles worn by bystanders to protect their 
privacy from unauthorized face detection. FacePET operates on image features (in particular Haar-
like features [26]) through visible light produced by the FacePET goggles to confuse face detection 
algorithms based on the Viola–Jones face detection algorithm [27]. If an unauthorized party takes a 
photo of the bystander with the FacePET system enabled, the action on the features is registered in 
the photo. Thus, if later an Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithm based on the Viola–Jones algorithm 
attempts to detect a bystander’s face, the goal of the FacePET is to prevent detection of the bystander’s 
facial features by the AI algorithm. 
The FacePET goggles are controlled via a mobile application at the bystanders’ mobile phone 
which permits the bystander to create privacy policies to automatically provide consent to third-party 
cameras. When a third-party authorized by the bystander wants to take a photo of the bystander, 
FacePET turns off the goggles and disables the operation. 
The concept of consent is a cornerstone in privacy [28–30], and in this context, FacePET improves 
upon previous bystander-based approaches to protect facial privacy by allowing the bystander to 
create his/her own privacy policies and provide the consent. We describe the complete FacePET 
system, how it acts on Haar-like features based on the Viola–Jones face detection algorithm, and its 
effectiveness in [25]. 
In this work, we present the results of a small user study with a focus on perceptions of users 
about the FacePET system and intelligent goggles with features to mitigate facial detection 
algorithms. While there have been past works [8,14,31–40] on understanding the perceptions of 
bystanders with respect to facial privacy, to the best of our knowledge, our user study is the first to 
address the perceptions of a smart wearable (IoT) system worn by bystanders with a privacy 
protection focus. 
Research contributions of this work 
We summarize the main research contributions of this work as follows: 
• We present a summary of human–computer interaction studies and systems related to facial 
privacy. 
• We present a user study of the FacePET system with a focus on users’ perceptions about the 
device and intelligent goggles with features to mitigate facial detection algorithms. 
• We discuss the results of the study to further enhance the FacePET system, as well as influence 
the development of future bystander-centric devices for facial privacy. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related works. In 
Section 3 we describe the FacePET system. Section 4 presents the results of our usability evaluation 
of FacePET. Finally, in Section 5, we make some concluding remarks and present future work. 
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2. Related Works 
2.1. Bystanders’ Facial Privacy: Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) Perspective 
From the HCI perspective, research studies related to bystanders’ privacy can be classified into 
two groups: (1) understanding the utilization/adoption of mobile, camera-enabled devices (i.e., 
mobile phones, wearables, IoT, and drones), and related technologies in shared spaces; (2) usability 
studies for facial privacy systems. These studies have been conducted using a variety of methods 
such as interviews, analysis of logged data (i.e., voice-mail diaries), online web comments, surveys, 
and a combination of more than one of these methods. We highlight some of these studies in Table 1. 
Table 1. Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) studies related to Bystanders’ Facial Privacy. 
Reference Research Focus Approach Comments 
Palen et al. 
[31] 
Mobile phones in 
shared spaces 
19 new mobile phone 
users tracked for six 
weeks. Voice mail 
diaries, interviews and 
calling behavior data 
collected for four 
months 
Users were inclined to modify 
their perceptions on social 
appropriateness from initial 
use. Highlighted a conflict of 
spaces (physical vs. virtual) 
Denning 
et al. [32] 
Augmented Reality 
(AR) glasses 
12 field sessions with 31 
bystanders interviewed 
and their reactions to a 
co-located AR device 
Participants identified different 
factors on making recording 
more/less acceptable and they 
expressed interest on being 
asked for consent to be 
recorded and record-blocking 
devices 
Motti et al. 
[33] 
Wearable devices 
including armbands, 
smart watches, 
earpieces, head bands, 
headphones and smart 
glasses  
Observational study of 
online comments 
posted by wearable 
users. A total of 72 
privacy comments 
analyzed 
Identified 13 user’s concerns 
about wearable privacy related 
to the type of data and how 
device collects, stores, 
processes and shares data. 
Concerns depend on type and 
design of device 
Hoyle et 
al. [34] 
Lifelogging with 
wearable camera 
devices 
In situ user study in 
which 36 participants 
wore a lifelogging 
device for a week, 
answered 
questionnaires on 
photos captured, and 
participated in an exit 
interview 
Users preferred to manage 
privacy through in situ 
physical control of image 
collection (rather than later), 
context determines sensitivity, 
and users were concerned 
about bystanders’ privacy 
although almost no opposition 
or concerns were expressed by 
bystanders during study 
Hoyle et 
al. [35] 
Privacy perceptions of 
online photos 
Survey deployed 
through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk) with 279 
respondents. Survey 
used 60 photos 
showing 10 different 
contextual conditions 
Respondents shared common 
expectations on the privacy 
norms of online images. Norms 
are socially contingent and 
multidimensional. Social 
contexts and sharing can affect 
social meaning of privacy 
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Zhang et 
al. [36]  
Privacy attitudes on 
video analytics 
technologies 
10 day longitudinal in 
situ study involving 
123 participants and 
2,328 deployment 
scenarios 
Privacy preferences vary with a 
number of factors (context). 
Some contexts make people 
feel uncomfortable. People 
have little awareness on the 
contexts where video analytics 
can be deployed 
Hatuka et 
al. [37]  
Smartphone users’ 
perceptions about 
contemporary 
meaning of 
public/private spaces 
Correlational study 
with 138 participants 
who took surveys and 
were observed by 
researchers for three 
months. Participants 
divided in two groups: 
basic phone users and 
advanced smart phone 
users 
Differences on the meaning of 
public/private spaces may be 
blurred and may be 
dynamically redefined by use 
of technology 
Wang et 
al. [38] 
Civilian use of 
drones/Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
16 semi-structured 
interviews to examine 
people’s perceptions on 
drones and usage 
under five specific 
scenarios. Participants 
were shown a real 
drone and videos about 
its capabilities before 
interview 
Differences on the meaning of 
public/private spaces for 
participants. Participants 
highlighted inconspicuous 
recording and inaccessible 
drone pilots to request for 
privacy as concerns and some 
participants expected for 
expected for consent to be 
asked before recording by 
drones 
Chang et 
al. [39] 
Drones 
Laboratory study with 
20 participants using 
real and simulated 
drones to elicit user 
perceptions about 
drone security and 
privacy. Study also 
used surveys, 
interviews and drone 
piloting exercises 
Drone design affects privacy 
and raises security concerns 
with drones. Recommended 
the use of geo-fencing to 
address privacy concerns, 
designated fly-
zones/“highways” for drones. 
Auditive and wind clues to 
inform of drone usage for 
bystanders 
Steil at al. 
[8] 
User evaluation of a 
privacy-preserving 
device to block a head-
mount camera 
12 participants with 
semi-structured one-to-
one interviews to 
evaluate an eye 
gesture-activated first-
person camera shutter 
blocker device 
controlled by Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) 
 
17 participants 
annotated video 
datasets for training 
data 
Eye-tracking can be used as a 
way to handle bystanders’ 
privacy as camera activates 
when person fixes eyesight. 
Non-invasive on the user. Eye 
tracking not perceived in 
general as a threat to privacy 
by participants.  
 
Privacy sensitivity varies 
largely among people, thus 
affecting the definition of 
privacy 
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Aditya et 
al. [14] 
Personal expectations 
and desires for privacy 
on photos when 
photographed as a 
bystander 
Survey deployed online 
via Google Forms with 
227 respondents from 
32 different countries 
Privacy concerns and privacy 
actions varied based on context 
(i.e., location, social situations) 
Ahmad et 
al. [40] 
People’s perceptions of 
and behaviors around 
current IoT devices as 
bystanders 
Interview study with 19 
participants 
Participants expressed 
concerns about uncertainty of 
IoT device’s state (if they were 
recording or not) and their 
purpose when being 
bystanders around these 
devices 
Our 
approach 
(FacePET) 
User study of a 
bystander-based 
wearable (smart 
glasses) to attack facial 
detection algorithms 
21 participants took 
survey on bystanders’ 
privacy, wore the 
FacePET device, saw 
the results of facial 
privacy protection on 
their faces, and 
answered questions on 
the usability of FacePET 
Most participants would use 
FacePET or a bystander-based 
facial privacy device. Most 
participants agreed that facial 
privacy features would 
improve the use and adoption 
of smart glasses 
We describe below some of the common findings among these studies: 
• Seven studies in Table 1 recruited less than 36 participants (five studies recruited 20 or less 
participants [8,31,38–40], and two studies recruited less than 36 participants [32,34]. Only two 
studies recruited more than 100 participants [36,37]. The studies with less than 36 participants 
use interviews, observation, testing of devices and some of them use surveys. The studies with 
more than 100 participants use surveys or automated ways (AI) to gather data of interest. 
• The definitions of private/public (shared) spaces and privacy perceptions vary among 
individuals. What is meant for a private/public space seems to depend on context (i.e., 
individuals, actions and devices used at any given location). 
• The design of the data capturing device has an impact on user and bystanders’ privacy 
perceptions. 
• Individuals want to have control of their facial privacy even though some contexts are less 
private-sensitive than others. 
In contrast to the related works discussed above which focused primarily on privacy perceptions 
of users/bystanders when photographed in shared/public spaces by different kinds of devices, and 
their perceptions about how these photographs are shared in social networks and used by external 
parties (i.e., in web/remote services for facial recognition), in this work we explore the perceptions of 
a bystander-centric device (smart goggles) to protect bystanders’ facial privacy. To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first study to explore user perceptions of a bystander-centric 
IoT/wearable system with a focus on privacy. 
2.2. Bystanders’ Facial Privacy: Solutions 
In the past we proposed a taxonomy [1] to classify solutions to handle bystanders’ facial privacy. 
Our taxonomy is composed of two major groups of solutions: location-dependent methods and 
obfuscation-dependent methods. Methods in these categories have differences in terms of 
effectiveness [25], usability [41], and power consumption [42]. We show this taxonomy in Figure 2 
and we present a summary of methods under each category in Table 2. 
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Figure 2. Taxonomy of methods for bystanders’ privacy protection [1]. 
2.2.1. Location-Dependent Methods 
The focus of location-dependent methods is to disable/enable the utilization of a capturing 
device at a particular location [43,44] or context. Location-based methods can be divided into two 
categories: 
• Banning/Confiscating devices: Even though they are non-technological solutions, 
banning/confiscating devices are the oldest method to handle bystanders’ privacy. In the U.S., 
this method was first used starting from the development of portable photographic cameras at 
the end of the 19th century [45]. Around this time, cameras were forbidden at some public spaces 
and private venues. 
• Disabling devices: In this group the goal is to disable a capturing device to protect bystanders’ 
privacy. Methods under this category can be further classified based on the technology used to 
disable the capturing device. In the first group (sensor saturation), a capturing device is disabled 
by some type of signal that interferes with a sensor that collects identifiable data [3]. In the 
broadcasting of commands group, a capturing device receives disabling messages via data 
communication interfaces (i.e., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, infrared) [4,5]. In the last group (context-based 
approaches) the capturing device identifies contexts using badges, labels, or it recognizes 
contexts [46] using Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods to determine if capturing cannot take place 
[6–8]. 
2.2.2. Obfuscation-Dependent Methods 
The goal of obfuscation-dependent methods is to hide the identity of bystanders to avoid their 
identification. Depending on who performs the action to hide a bystander, these methods can be 
classified into two categories: 
• Bystander-based obfuscation: In this category, bystanders avoid their facial identification either by 
using technological solutions to hide or perturb bystanders’ identifiable features, or by 
performing a physical action such as asking somebody to stop capturing data, or simply leaving 
a shared/public space. Our FacePET [25] wearable device falls into this category. 
• Device-based obfuscation: In this group, third-party devices which are not owned by the bystander 
perform blurring or add noise (in the signal processing sense) to the image captured from the 
bystander to hide his/her identity. Depending on how the software at the capturing device 
performs the blurring, solutions in this category can be further classified into default obfuscation 
(any face in the image will be blurred) [19], selective obfuscation (third-party device users select 
who to obfuscate in the image) [20], or collaborative obfuscation (third-party and bystander’s 
device collaborate via wireless protocols [47] to allow a face to be blurred) [21]. A drawback of 
device-based obfuscation method is that a bystander must trust a device that he/she does not 
control to protect his/her privacy. 
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Table 2. Recently proposed technological solutions for bystanders’ facial privacy. 
Category Subcategory Method 
Location 
 
 
Methods disable or ban the utilization of 
capturing devices 
Disabling devices–sensor 
saturation BlindSpot [3]  
Disabling services–
Broadcasting of commands 
Using infrared to disable 
devices [4]  
Using Bluetooth to 
disable devices [5]  
Disabling devices–context-
based 
Virtual Walls [6]  
Privacy-restricted areas 
[7] 
World-driven access 
control [15]  
Sensor Tricorder [16] 
PlaceAvoider [17]  
PrivacEye: [8]  
Obfuscation 
 
Methods hide the identity of bystanders’ 
faces to avoid identification 
Bystander–based 
NotiSense [9]  
PrivacyVisor [10] 
PrivacyVisor III [11]  
Perturbed eyeglass frames 
[12] 
Invisibility Glasses [18] 
Device-based–default 
Privacy Google 
StreetView [19]  
Device-based–selective 
ObscuraCam [13] 
Respectful cameras [21]  
Invisible Light Beacons 
[23] 
Negative face blurring 
[24] 
Device-based–collaborative 
I–pic [14]  
PrivacyCamera [20]  
Do Not Capture [22]  
3. The FacePET System 
3.1. Adversarial Machine Learning Attacks on the Viola–Jones Algorithm 
To detect a face automatically in an image, supervised machine learning (classification) methods 
in image processing can be used. Given an image/photo x and a face detection (classification) 
method/algorithm Fd, the goal of Fd is to classify (or assign a label) to the image x such that if x 
contains a face, then Fd(x) = 1, and if x does not contain a face then Fd(x) = 0. 
The process of finding a vulnerability to make classification algorithms fail is an application of 
a field called adversarial machine learning [48,49] which studies how an adversary/attacker can 
generate attacks to render machine learning models/methods ineffective. For face detection, this 
process can be done by applying a transformation Tr(x) on the image such that if Fd(x) = 1, then 
Fd(Tr(x)) = 0. In other words, if x contains a face, the goal of an adversary during the face detection 
process is to find a method/transformation of a face in x so the face detection method does not detect 
the face. The transformation can be done after the image x has been captured by a camera, which in 
this case, Tr(x) is performed by software, or Tr(x) can be generated as part of the process to capture 
an image wherein a person (i.e., a bystander) in the photo has a physical method to execute the 
transformation which is recorded/stored in the image. Thus, the goal for FacePET is to physically 
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generate a transformation to prevent the Haar-like features from being used by the face detection 
(classification) algorithm. A Haar-like feature is calculated using the following formula: 
h(r1, r2) = s(r1) − s(r2) (1) 
In this formula, s(r1) is the average of pixel intensities in “white” regions, and s(r2) is the average 
of pixel intensities in the “black” regions of predefined black/white patterns that are juxtaposed over 
an image (or a region of an image). The patterns are engineered to train classification models using 
machine learning algorithms and the Haar-like features. Once the model is trained, the patterns are 
used in images to calculate the Haar-like features, which then serve as inputs to the trained classifier. 
Figure 3 presents the predefined black/white patterns used by Viola–Jones to calculate Haar-like 
features for face detection. 
 
Figure 3. Predefined patterns to calculate Haar-like features in the Viola and Jones algorithm [27]. 
When using these patterns, the Viola–Jones algorithm creates windows of different sizes (sub-
regions/sub images), calculates the Haar-like features for each window using the patterns, and then 
each window is passed through a classifier Fd(x) that outputs 1 if a face is detected. Performing 
adversarial attacks on a Viola–Jones face detection algorithm can be achieved by generating noise (in 
the signal processing sense) in the bystander’s face (or photo) such that the values of the Haar-like 
features make a Viola–Jones classifier fail. 
In FacePET [25], PrivacyVisor [10], and Invisibility glasses [18], these attacks are performed 
using Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) (either through visible light in the case of FacePET or infrared 
light in the case of PrivacyVisor and Invisibility glasses) embedded in goggles. Figure 4 shows an 
example of a detected face without the attack (Figure 4a) and an undetected face with the attack 
(Figure 4b). This figure shows screenshots of an application that we created using the OpenCV’s 
implementation of the Viola–Jones algorithm to demonstrate the attack on the Haar-like features. We 
note that when the face is detected the software superimposes a blue square around the area of the 
face, and green squares around the area of the eyes and mouth (Figure 4a). However, when the 
features are attacked, the software fails to detect the face (Figure 4b) and no squares are superimposed 
on the face. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 4. Face detection with the Viola–Jones algorithm (a) Face detected/FacePET googles off; (b) 
Face not detected/FacePET with goggles on. The superposed blue and green squares in the left figure 
indicate the detection of a face. In the right figure, the attack with the LEDs is successful because no 
squares are superimposed (attack on Haar-like features performed). 
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Recent advances in deep learning and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) have improved 
the accuracy of image processing methods, including face detection methods. While in Viola–Jones 
methods the features for face detection are hand-crafted through the use patterns and Haar-like 
features to achieve the detection, in CNN-based algorithms there is no need for any of the two, 
because CNN can learn the features needed to achieve the detection through the automated training 
of neural networks [50]. However, CNNs for face detection can also be subject to adversarial machine 
learning attacks that include the optimization of adversarial generator networks for face detection 
[51], image-level distortions (i.e., modifications of the image’s appearance not related to faces) and 
face-level distortions (i.e., modifications of facial landmarks in an image) [52]. 
3.2. The Facial Privacy Enabled Technology (FacePET) System 
In Section 2.2, we described different classes of facial privacy systems that are not controlled by 
bystanders, and many do not provide a choice for bystanders before a photo is taken (i.e., still a 
bystander can be photographed inadvertently and identified without consent). These systems require 
bystanders to trust other parties to protect their own facial privacy without a choice or assurances to 
bystanders that their privacy is indeed being protected. We argue that the best types of facial privacy 
systems are those that provide methods for bystanders to make choices for their own facial privacy 
before a photo can be taken. We developed FacePET [25] under this premise. Figure 5 shows the 
components of the FacePET system. 
 
Figure 5. The FacePET system. 
The major components of FacePET include: 
• FacePET wearable: The FacePET wearable (as Figure 6 shows) is composed of goggles with 6 
strategically placed Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs), a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)-enabled 
microcontroller, and a power supply. When a bystander wears and activates the wearable, the 
FacePET wearable emits green light that generates noise (in the signal processing sense) and 
confuse Haar-like features for the Viola–Jones algorithm. The BLE microcontroller allows the 
bystander to turn on/off the lights through a Graphical User Interface (GUI) implemented as a 
mobile application and runs on the bystanders’ mobile phone. 
• FacePET mobile applications: We implemented two mobile applications for the FacePET system. 
The first mobile application, namely the Bystander’s mobile app implements a GUI to turn on/off 
the FacePET wearable through commands broadcast using BLE communications. The 
Bystander’s mobile app also implements an Access Control List (ACL) in which third-party 
cameras are authorized to disable the wearable and take photos. Different types of policies can 
be enforced for external parties to disable the wearable. For example, for a specific third-party 
user, the Bystander’s mobile app can limit the number of times the wearable can be disabled for 
that third-party user. Further privacy policies based on contexts (i.e., location) can also be 
implemented. The second app, called the Third-party (stranger) mobile application, issues requests 
to disable the wearable and take photos of the bystander with wearable’s lights off. In the current 
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prototype, the Third-party (stranger) mobile application connects to the Bystander’s mobile app via 
Bluetooth [53]. Figure 7 presents screenshots of both mobile applications. 
• FacePET consent protocol: The FacePET consent protocol (as Figure 8 shows) enables a mechanism 
that creates a list of trusted cameras (an ACL) at the bystander’s mobile application. In our 
current prototype the consent protocol is implemented over Bluetooth. 
 
(a) 
(b) (c)  
 
(d) 
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Figure 6. The FacePET wearable device. (a) Wiring sketch diagram for FacePET LEDs; (b) Schematic; 
(c) Goggles with LEDs and BLE microcontroller; (d) FacePET wearable prototype worn by a 
bystander. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 7. FacePET’s system mobile app screenshots. (a) Bystanders’ application; (b) Stranger (third-
party). 
 
Figure 8. Sequence diagram for FacePET’s consent protocol. 
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4. A User Evaluation on Perceptions of FacePET and Bystander-Based Facial Privacy Devices 
4.1. Methodology 
We applied for an approval from the CSU’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct our 
study. The initial recruitment of participants was conducted by sending a flyer through Columbus 
State University’s (CSU) e-mail system. The flyer explained the steps for participants to take part in 
the study which was performed in a room at the CSU’s Synovous Center for Commerce and 
Technology. Once in the room, each participant filled out an informed consent form that provided 
information about the research and its risks. Next, participants filled out an initial survey (called the 
“Bystander’s Privacy Survey”) to gauge their knowledge about the concept of bystanders’ privacy as 
well as their personal preferences on having their photos taken in certain situations and places. We 
used questions from the survey developed for the I-Pic system [14]. Figure 9 shows the questions 
asked in the survey. 
After the initial survey, participants wore the FacePET wearable and had their photo taken using 
the rear-facing camera of an iPhone 7 in an indoor setting (i.e., a lab) with the wearable system being 
active and inactive. The captured photos were then used as input in a Python application that used 
the OpenCV’s face detection Application Programming Interface (API) [26] implementation which 
provides an open source implementation of the Viola–Jones face detection algorithm [27]. Figure 3 
shows screenshots of this application. The results of the face detection were presented to the 
participants (as Figure 3 shows) before they filled out a second survey (called the “Usability Survey”) 
about the use of the wearable device and their attitudes about it. Figure 10 shows the questions we 
asked in this second survey. Once this second survey was completed, the participants concluded their 
participation in the study. A total of n = 21 participants took part of this study and we raffled a gift 
card for USD 25.00 among the participants as an incentive reward for their participation. Table 3 
presents the participants’ demographics in this study. All participants were at least 18 years old. 
 
Figure 9. Bystanders’ privacy survey questions. 
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Figure 10. FacePET’s usability/user perceptions survey questions. 
Table 3. Participant demographics. 
Participants’ Characteristics Number of Participants 
Age group 
Less than 20 years 1 
20–30 years 17 
30–40 years 3 
Gender  Male 14 
Female 7 
Educational level  
High school 1 
Some college credits 14 
Associate’s degree 1 
Bachelor’s degree 4 
Master’s degree 1 
4.2. Study Results 
The initial bystanders’ privacy survey assessed the participant’s knowledge about facial and 
bystanders’ privacy and how it affects them. Participants were first asked questions about how they 
feel themselves with respect to technology and how often they took pictures and videos. They were 
also asked how much they knew about the issue of bystanders’ privacy and if they found it to be an 
important issue in today’s world. Out of the 21 participants, 19 of them considered themselves to be 
tech savvy. When asked how often they took pictures/videos, 11 participants took pictures often while 
the rest answered not so often (8 participants) or very little (2 participants). When asked about 
bystanders’ privacy and how much they knew about bystanders’ privacy, surprisingly, most of them 
did not know much about the issue or not at all (11 participants adding both choices). In this question, 2 
participants stated that they knew a lot about it and 7 participants stated that they knew enough. After 
these questions and being introduced to the topic, most of the participants were in agreement that it 
is an important issue in today’s world (18 participants), and the rest stating that it was not (3 participants). 
When asked about the preferred privacy actions in certain contexts such as being at the gym, in a 
bar, at the beach, among others (see Figure 11), the participants were given for each situation five 
choices (I agree to be captured in any photograph; I agree to be captured, but please send me a copy of any 
photograph that includes me; Please obscure my appearance in any photograph that includes me; I can decide 
my preference only after I see the photograph; I do not wish to be captured in any photograph). The most 
common choice among all contexts was “I can decide my preference only after I see the photograph” (32% 
of all choices). The second most frequent choice was “I agree to be captured in any photograph” with 
28.07% of all choices). It is worth noting that in general, 15 participants chose a privacy action other 
than always agreeing to be photographed. This result demonstrates that, among our survey 
participants, they prefer some type of privacy protection when photographed. In this part of the 
survey we had a total of 228 answers. 
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From the results of the survey, we found that the participants of our study prefer to be 
photographed without restrictions in some communal places and activities such as outdoor activities, 
workplaces, at private gatherings with known people (i.e., family and friends), while they do not 
wish to be photograph in places and activities related to health (i.e, at hospitals, at gyms). It worth 
noting that the most preferred choice for places such as in bars/nightclubs, at the beach, at a place of 
worship, and in a restaurant was “I can decide my preference only after I see the photograph”. These results 
show that, in health-related activities, and in contexts that involve consumer/lifestyle habits (i.e., bars, 
beaches, and restaurants) participants of the study want to control their privacy. This conclusion is 
similar to past works with a focus on bystander’s privacy perceptions (as described in Section 2.1). 
 
Figure 11. Participants’ preferred privacy actions in various contexts. The scale in the radar chart 
indicate frequency of participants and the lines indicate a context. Vertices indicate a privacy action. 
The last section of the initial bystanders’ privacy survey evaluated the participants’ comfort 
levels about who may be a photographer taking photos of them and what the photographer can do 
with the photos regardless of any specific situation. For each type of photographer/action, the 
participant could choose five comfort levels (in a Likert scale). Figure 12 shows the results of these 
questions. In the figure, the Likert scale has been reduced to three categories to simplify the 
visualization and analysis. In these questions, less comfortable choices (little less and much less) 
represented 35.24% of all choices, neutral choice (“I will feel the same”) represented 32.86% of all 
choices, and more comfortable choices represented 31.9%. In these questions, participants felt more 
comfortable in situations where there was some type of privacy protection or the photographer was 
somebody professional or known to the participant. Finally, participants felt less comfortable if the 
photos were to be published without consent, if the photographer was a stranger, and if there were 
children in the proximity of the photo. These results demonstrate that participants were concerned 
about their facial privacy when photos are taken and published without their knowledge. In this part 
of the survey there were 210 answers. The results in this part of the study are similar to past works 
in the area of bystanders’ perceptions on photo sharing (see Section 2.1). 
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Figure 12. Participants’ comfort levels on photographers and actions with photos. The scale in the 
chart shows the frequency of participants and the lines indicate a comfort level. Vertices indicate a 
context. 
The participants then wore the FacePET system. Each individual was photographed using the 
rear-facing camera of an Apple iPhone 7 mobile phone with the device enabled (privacy protection) 
and disabled. These photos were then fed into the OpenCV’s face detection script (Figure 3). Out of 
the 21 participants, six participants’ faces were detected, giving the device’s a success rate in 
protecting a user’s face around 71%. A handful of the participants also took pictures using their own 
mobile phones so that comparisons could be made for how effective the device worked regardless of 
the different cameras. The participants were then shown the results of the application (Figure 3) and 
then they answered the usability/user perceptions survey shown in Figure 10. 
While conducting the experiment on capturing the photos, we noticed that the glasses seemed a 
little bit big on some of the participants who had thinner or smaller facial structures. This caused 
OpenCV’s face detection script to detect their faces as the FacePET device failed to thwart the facial 
features. We also observed that the illumination in the room where the experiment was conducted 
diminished the effectiveness of the device. We plan to address these aspects in the future. 
After using the FacePET system and answering the usability survey, 17 participants found the 
system easy to understand and use. When asked if the device was something they would use on a 
daily basis, nine participants answered affirmatively, while the rest stated that they would not use 
the device in its current state. Within the group of participants who answered that they would not 
use the device (12 participants), we asked if they would use a similar version of the device (one that 
would achieve the same goals for privacy protection). In this question, 7 out of 12 participants 
answered affirmatively. 
Even though the original FacePET system is not a wearable that most of the participants would 
use, when adding those participants who initially answered yes (9 participants) to use FacePET and 
those who would use a similar version (7 participants), the majority of the participants (16 
participants out of 21) would use FacePET or similar devices (i.e., other bystander-based devices) to 
protect their facial privacy. Most of the concerns or reasons surrounding participants not wanting to 
use the device seemed to be because of the device’s form factor. Some of these reasons indicated by 
the participants included: 
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• The current model is too big and draws attention. 
• The model is not stylish and can obstruct vision. 
• Select participants do not really take pictures or engage in the media market in such a manner. 
When the participants were asked about how people would react when seeing them wearing the 
device, a variety of responses given were: 
• Person laughs and says, “Stupid glasses”. 
• People would stare a lot. 
• People would be confused at first or creeped out. 
• People would ask why the user was wearing such a device. 
• The device would only invite more people to take pictures of it. 
From these answers, it seems there would be plenty of confusion on others around the user about 
the purpose of the device and why someone would wear it in its current form factor. Despite the fact 
that some of the feedback obtained relates specifically on our FacePET prototype, it is worth pointing 
out that the majority of the participants did agree that if smart glasses had features to conceal users’ 
identities, it would allow such smart glasses to become more popular with 17 participants stating yes, 
3 participants feeling indifferent, and 1 participant stating no. Finally, we gathered some suggestions 
on how to improve our FacePET prototype. Some of the improvements that were repeated among 
the responses include a more fashionable design, a better size (smaller) for the goggles, and fixing the 
long wires that connect the power supply with the goggles and the microcontroller in the current 
prototype. 
4.3. Study Limitations 
Due to the sample size (n = 21) of our study and because all participants recruited in our study 
were from Columbus State University, the findings of this study cannot be generalized to a broader 
population. Thus, if we conduct our study with a broader and more diverse population, we may 
obtain different results to the ones currently presented in this work. As such, our conclusions are 
written in terms that relate to our participants rather than a broader population. While our sample 
size and its characteristics are similar to previous works that also used interviews, testing of devices 
and the study of users in the wild [8,31,32,34,35,40], we acknowledge that to achieve external validity 
we will need to scale our experiment to reach a broader population to increase both the sample size 
and its diversity. To achieve this, we propose as future work the development of an experiment 
wherein participants do not rely on the FacePET device for the study, but by using current advances 
in AI in face and eye detection, we could simulate how a participant would look with a bystander-
based privacy protection device similar to FacePET, followed by participants interacting with an 
interface that simulates the device, and finally have participants answer an online survey or record 
them answering open questions about the simulated device. We plan to conduct this study in our 
future research works. 
5. Conclusions 
In this work we conducted a user study to assess user perceptions about the FacePET system or 
similar bystander-centric devices for facial privacy protection. We conducted our study with 21 
participants who took a survey to gather information about facial and bystanders’ privacy, privacy 
choices with cameras, and preferences about sharing photos. Participants then used the FacePET 
wearable and answered a second survey about the usability and perceptions of the system and/or 
similar devices. We found evidence that participants want some type of privacy protection when 
photographed, especially in contexts that involve consumer/lifestyle habits, and they do not wish to 
be photographed in contexts that involve health-related activities or locations. Participants also 
showed concerns about their facial privacy when photos are taken and published without their 
knowledge. 
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When the participants used the FacePET system, we found that even though they would not use 
the current prototype on a daily basis because of its bulkiness and unfashionable design, most of the 
participants agreed that they would use a device similar to FacePET to protect their facial privacy. 
Participants finally agreed that if smart glasses had features that would allow users to protect their 
facial privacy, this feature would make smart glasses more popular with the general public. 
For future work, we will develop a research study to recruit more participants and address the 
external validity of the conclusions of our small study. To achieve this, we plan to create a research 
protocol that does not require the utilization of a physical wearable (e.g., access to a FacePET 
prototype) to scale the data collection. In addition, based on the results of the FacePET evaluation, 
we plan to improve the appearance of the FacePET design. Finally, we plan also to improve the facial 
privacy protection aspects of the device to protect against newer face detection and recognition 
systems based on deep learning and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). 
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